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Abstract
Providing security for protecting critical infrastructure is a key concern among the world nations, given the rising menace of
terrorism. Due to limited security resources, full security coverage of targets (infrastructure) at all times is not possible. Eﬃcient
surveillance and allocation of security personnel among targets is an important problem in several real life security scenarios.
The adversaries may observe and exploit patterns in selective surveillance of targets. Therefore, there is a need for eﬃciently
allocating security personnel to targets. This calls for randomised strategies for personnel allocation and surveillance. We use
a game-theoretic approach for modeling and studying such security problems. The problem is modeled as a security game built
upon the Stackelberg game model. The game is played between two players - the Leader (Defender) and the Follower (Attacker).
Our model provides an optimal randomized strategy for the leader (security personal), under the assumption that the follower
(adversary) will conduct surveillance before launching an attack on the target. Analysing the optimal defender’s strategies under a
variety of settings helps in optimal resource allocation and planning for surveillance.
c© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Program Committee of IES2013.
Keywords: Game theory, Stackelberg game, Optimisation
1. Introduction
Globally, there is a need for protecting the critical infrastructure at places of political and economical importance.
The problem is to ﬁnd a way of allocating security personnel to protect the critical infrastructure, taking into account
the strategic nature of the attacker. The strategic nature of the attacker comes from the fact that the attacker can observe
the defender’s daily security routine and exploit any deterministic strategy of the defender to it’s advantage. A naive
approach will be to allocate as much security personnel to the infrastructure as needed, but the required number of
security personnel is greater than the number of personnel available. Hence, it is impossible to protect all the targets
at all times, the need is to come up with randomised allocation of security personal to the targets.
Using the Stackelberg model, we capture the strategic interaction between the defender and the attacker and ﬁnd
the optimal solution to allocate security personnel to protect critical infrastructure in a variety of settings. In a security
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scenario having targets to be protected, the security personnel may visit the targets in any sequence. All possible
enumerations of patrol sequences form the set of schedules taken up by the security personnel for patrolling. Also, in
the set of targets, some targets may be more critical than the others, with the critical targets being heavily guarded, in
the sense that the critical targets are revisited in a patrol sequence with same/diﬀerent defensive activities. Moreover,
in a security scenario there may be multiple defenders and multiple attackers which results in increase in action space
of each of the agents. To capture such scenarios into the payoﬀ model requires careful thinking about the utilities of
the agents. A solution technique ﬁnds how to optimally patrol critical infrastructure in order to maximize protection,
knowing that the adversary may conduct surveillance and then launch an attack. Also, the targets to be patrolled may
have some predetermined threshold requirements by which they must be atleast protected. The solution technique
also provides for optimal patrols with new constraints introduced.
In the last few years, there has been remarkable research conducted in multiagent systems using game-theory for
real-world security. Security applications based on sound principles of game-theory like ARMOR1, PROTECT2 have
been deployed for real world security. These systems aid in decision making.
1.1. Problem Description
The general problem is to allocate optimally, a set of security personnel to protect critical infrastructure. The con-
straint involved is that the number of personnel required is greater than the number of personnel available. Analysing
strategies of the security personnel for making tactical decisions is also an important problem. Although, remarkable
research has been done in this area, to model the security scenario and its complexities in completeness is always a
challenge.
1.2. Contributions
We have contributed in the following ways:
• For conducting surveillance at a security location, the targets to be protected are visited by the security per-
sonnel in some sequence. For all possible sequences, patrol schedules need to be generated. Unlike previous
applications2, the patrol schedules are generated with restricted patrol sequences with a reduced state space.
We take a general approach of generating patrol schedules which start and end at any patrol area for protecting
the targets at a security location and enumerate all possible patrol sequences with a much larger and complete
state space.
• During surveillance, the security agent may revisit some targets which get reﬂected as repeated targets in the
patrol schedules. All possible enumerations patrol sequences, taking into account any repeated targets are
generated.
• The solution approach3 is used for ﬁnding optimal defender’s strategies. In addition, the security agent’s strate-
gies are analysed with respect to the criticality of the targets and the patrolling eﬃciency probabilities of the
defensive activities conducted at the targets.
• Unlike the previous applications which consider only the single defender/single attacker case, we model the
problem in multiple defenders/multiple attackers case in a nonzero-sum game setting, giving a concrete example
for generating the action space and utilities of the agents.
• Unlike the previous solution approach, the targets get protected by arbitrary probabilities in the optimal de-
fender’s strategy. We give the model for the problem where the targets have an assurance level, which is some
predetermined probability vector with which they are atleast protected.
2. Relevant Work
There are many other competing models in use for security related applications. Babu et al. 4 have worked on
modeling passenger security system at US airports using linear programming approaches, however, their objective
is to classify the passengers in various groups and then screen them based on the group they belong to. The Hyper-
cube Queuing Model5 based on queuing theory, depicts the detailed spatial operation of urban police departments
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and emergency medical services and has found application in police beat design, allocation of patrolling time etc.
However, this model does not take the strategic attacker actions into account; Stackelberg model, on the other hand,
tailors policies to combat various potential adversaries. Hence, the game-theory has been used successfully for these
problems as it captures the strategic interactions between the defender and the attacker in terms of action space and
the utilities, which other multiagent models fail to capture.
2.1. Preliminaries
2.1.1. Stackelberg Game
A generic Stackelberg game has two players, a leader and a follower. The leader is also called the defender,
whereas the follower is also called an attacker. The leader ﬁrst commits to a mixed strategy that can be observed
by the other agent (the follower or adversary) before the adversary best responds to the leader’s mixed strategy. The
diﬀerent strategies of the optimal mixed strategy are given appropriate weights to arrive at the randomised schedule.
The defender randomises the schedules as the attacker can conduct surveillance and attack any deterministic strategy.
2.2. Solution Approach
We use DOBSS3 as a solution technique. Compared to previous heuristical methods6, it is not only faster but also
avoids the signiﬁcant problems of infeasibility faced by those methods. DOBSS obtains a decomposition scheme by
exploiting the property that follower types are independent of each other.
Let M be a large positive number. Given a priori probabilities pl, with l ∈ L, of facing each follower type the leader
solves the following optimization problem:
max
x,q
∑
i∈X
∑
l∈L
∑
j∈Q
plRli jxiq
l
j
s.t.
∑
i∈X
xi = 1
∑
j∈Q
qlj = 1
0 ≤ (al −
∑
i∈X
Cli jxi) ≤ (1 − qlj)M
xi ∈ [0, 1]
qlj ∈ {0, 1}
2.3. Security Games
Security games are a restricted class of Stackelberg games based on the size of schedules and characteristics of
resources.
3. Analysis of Defender’s Strategies in Single Defender/Single Attacker Scenario
3.1. Stackelberg Game Model
An important problem is to protect infrastructure and facilities at locations which need to be protected. Within the
location, there is a need to conduct patrols to protect the infrastructure. While the adversary can observe the patrol
patterns, limited security resources imply that the security personal cannot be at all the places all the time.
We consider a scenario with four targets (infrastructure) which need to be protected by defender by conducting patrols.
Some targets are grouped together into patrol areas based on the geographic proximity to each other and they can be
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observed together at the same time. We group target 1 and target 2 under patrol area 1, target 2 under patrol area 2
and target 4. under patrol area 3. We have taken the following case scenario:
Fig. 1. A Case Scenario
A set of defensive activities can be performed on the patrol areas. If a patrol area is visited more than once with
diﬀerent defensive activities, then the highest eﬀective defensive activity is considered for calculating payoﬀs. There
is a maximum patrol time that any patrolling schedule can take. A patrol schedule starts from any patrol area, visits
the intermediate patrol areas and can end at any patrol area; time bounded by the maximum patrol time. We ﬁx the
starting patrol area and enumerate all possible patrol schedules which are possible, given a scenario consisting of a
target vector t j and a set of patrol areas N. We provide a solution which is a mixed strategy of the patrol schedules,
maximizing the defender’s reward according to the Stackelberg game.
We model the problem as a Stackelberg game which consists of two players: the security agent (the defender) and the
adversary (the attacker) in a world consisting of t targets and a set k of defensive activities that can be performed at
each of the target locations.
We deﬁne the following:
1. The set of defender strategies: The set of all possible enumerations of the patrol schedules given a case scenario.
2. The set of attacker strategies: The set of targets, where each target can be attacked with probability 1, i.e a pure
strategy. 3. The payoﬀ function
t j : Target j.
Rdi : Defender reward on covering t j if it’s attacked.
Pdi : Defender penalty on not covering t j if it’s attacked.
Rai : Attacker reward on attacking t j if it’s not covered.
Pai : Attacker penalty on attacking t j if it’s covered.
Ddi j : Defender’s Payoﬀ when the defender patrols patrol schedule i and attacker attacks target j.
Aai j : Attacker’s Payoﬀ when the defender patrols patrol schedule i and attacker attacks target j.
Li j : Patrolling Eﬃciency Probability of the defensive activity performed by the defender on t j for patrol schedule
i. A defensive activity can have a value between 0 and 1.
3.2. The Payoﬀ Model
The payoﬀ model for single defender/single attacker case with homogeneous resources is described as follows:
If a target j is the attacker’s choice and is also part of a patrol schedule, then the defender would gain a reward Rdj
while the attacker would receive a penalty Paj , else the defender would receive a penalty P
d
j and the attacker would
gain a reward Raj . Furthermore, let D
d
i j be the payoﬀ for the defender if the defender chooses patrol schedule i and the
attacker chooses to attack target j. Ddi j can be represented as a linear combination of the defender reward/penalty on
target j and Li j, the patrolling eﬃciency probability of the defensive activity performed on target j for patrol schedule
i, as described by the following equation. The value of Li j is 0 if target j is not in patrol schedule i.
Defender Payoﬀ: Ddi j = Li jR
d
i + (1 − Li j)Pdi
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Attacker Payoﬀ: Adi j = −Ddi j
For nonzero-sum game, in addition to the variables deﬁned for the zero-sum game we have one more variable which
needs to be deﬁned as follows:
C j : Attacker’s cost vector for targets.
Defender Payoﬀ: Ddi j = Li jR
d
i + (1 − Li j)Pdi
Attacker Payoﬀ: Adi j = −Ddi j −C j
3.3. Patrol Schedule Generation
The approach we take is the most general in the sense that a patrol can start from any patrol area and end at any
patrol area. We enumerate all possible patrol schedules possible according to the scenario.
Fig. 2. The Architecture for Schedule Generation
Steps in generating the schedules:
1. Given the number of patrol areas to be covered, and the number of repetitions of patrol area allowed within a
patrol sequence, all possible enumerations of patrol sequences is done.
2. For each patrol sequence generated above, we expand it to more patrol sequences based on the time taken by
individual defensive activities and the total patrol time bound. So, each patrol sequence gets expanded to more
patrol sequences.
3. For all the patrol sequences, we ﬁnd the intermediate payoﬀ matrix based on the mapping between the patrol
area and the targets. The intermediate payoﬀ matrix gets ﬁlled with the patrolling eﬃciency probability values
of the defensive activities covering the corresponding targets.
4. Finally, using the payoﬀ model, the payoﬀs for the defender and the attacker are computed.
We deﬁne some variables as follows:
numArea: It gives the total number of patrol areas present at the infrastructure location.
numAreaCov: It gives the total number of patrol areas taken up for patrolling.
numTarget: It gives the total number of targets to be protected.
patMap: This vector gives the mapping between the patrol areas and the targets covered my them.
patTime: This vector gives time taken by individual defensive activities.
maxRep: It gives the number of repetitions (atmost) of a patrol area within a patrol sequence.
We give an example below:
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numArea = 3, numTarget = 4, timeBound = 100 minutes, patTime = [10, 40], patMap = [1 1 2 3], patEﬃciency =
[0.5 0.75], numAreaCov = 3, maxRep = 1
Initial Patrol Sequences:
[
1 2 3
1 3 2
]
(1:Patrol Area 1, 2:Patrol Area 2, 3:Patrol Area 3)
Defensive Activity Matrix:
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 1
1 1 2
1 2 1
2 1 1
1 2 2
2 1 2
2 2 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(1:Defensive Activity 1, 2:Defensive Activity 2)
The cartesian product of Initial Patrol Sequence and Defensive Activity Matrix yields an expanded list of 14 patrol
schedules.
3.3.1. Intermediate Payoﬀ Matrix Generation
The Intermediate Payoﬀ Matrix gives for each target how much eﬀective is the defender’s defensive activity in
circumventing the attacker at that target. If a patrol area is revisited with a more eﬀective defensive activity then, then
that defensive activity is considered for payoﬀ generation.
Table 1. Intermediate PayoﬀMatrix
Payoﬀ:(Defender,Attacker)Tgt 1Tgt 2Tgt 3Tgt 4
Schedules
1. (1:k1),(2:k1),(3:k1) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
2. (1:k1),(2:k1),(3:k2) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75
3. (1:k1),(2:k2),(3:k1) 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5
4. (1:k2),(2:k1),(3:k1) 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5
5. (1:k1),(2:k2),(3:k2) 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75
6. (1:k2),(2:k1),(3:k2) 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75
7. (1:k2),(2:k2),(3:k1) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5
8. (1:k1),(3:k1),(2:k1) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
9. (1:k1),(3:k1),(2:k2) 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5
10. (1:k1),(3:k2),(2:k1) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75
11. (1:k2),(3:k1),(2:k1) 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5
12. (1:k1),(3:k2),(2:k2) 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75
13. (1:k2),(3:k1),(2:k2) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5
14. (1:k2),(3:k2),(2:k1) 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75
Using the intermediate payoﬀ matrix, and the payoﬀ model the ﬁnal payoﬀ matrix is calculated.
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Table 2. Small Portion of the Final PayoﬀMatrix
Payoﬀ:(Defender,Attacker) Tgt 1 Tgt 2 Tgt 3 Tgt 4
Schedules
1. (1:k1),(2:k1),(3:k1) 50,-50 30,-3015,-1510,-10
2. (1:k1),(2:k1),(3:k2) 50,-50 30,-3015,-1525,-25
3. (1:k1),(2:k2),(3:k1) 50,-50 30,-3032,-3210,-10
4. (1:k2),(2:k1),(3:k1) 100,-10060,-6015,-1510,-10
5. (1:k1),(2:k2),(3:k2) 50,-50 30,-3032,-3225,-25
6. (1:k2),(2:k1),(3:k2) 100,-10060,-6015,-1525,-25
7. (1:k2),(2:k2),(3:k1) 100,-10060,-6032,-3210,-10
8. (1:k1),(3:k1),(2:k1) 50,-50 30,-3015,-1510,-10
3.4. Analysis of Defensive Activity in Schedules
With the change in the patrolling eﬃciency probability of the defensive activities performed at the targets and the
patrol schedules selected, the corresponding reward to the defender changes. We analyze the role of defensive activity
in schedules as follows:
3.4.1. Experiments and Results
The experiments have been carried out using the case scenario given before. To generate the synthetic payoﬀ data,
we have initialised the values for the variables as follows: patTime = 100 min, the total patrol time
Number of defensive activities are two i.e k1 and k2
k1 = 10 min, time duration for k1 defensive activity
k2 = 40 min, time duration for k2 defensive activity
b = 1, the base patrol
numTargets = 4, the number of targets
Rdj = [150 90 50 40], Reward to the defender
Pdj = [-50 -30 -20 -20], Penalty to the attacker
Li j = [0.5 0.75] This is the patrolling eﬃciency probability of a defensive activity performed by the defender for patrol
schedule i.
Using the payoﬀ model for the zero-sum, we analyse the role of patrolling eﬃciency probability of a defensive
activity. The patrolling eﬃciency probability of a defensive activity k1 and k2 is varied and the output with respect to
optimal defender’s reward is analysed. The following variations on k1 and k2 are carried out.
1. k2 increases from 0 to 1 and k1 ﬁxed at 0.5.
2. k1 increases from 0 to 1 and k2 ﬁxed at 0.75.
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Fig. 3. Defender reward w.r.t patrolling eﬃciency probability of defensive activities
Table 3. The selected mixed strategy when k2 increases from 0 to 1 and k1 is ﬁxed at 0.5
Strategy Pb Strategy Pb Rwd
k2
0.1 1 : k1, 2 : k1, 3 : k1 0.6 1 : k2, 2 : k1, 3 : k1 0.4 10
0.2 1 : k1, 2 : k1, 3 : k1 1 10
0.3 1 : k2, 2 : k1, 3 : k1 0.8 1 : k1, 3 : k1, 2 : k1 0.2 10
0.4 1 : k1, 2 : k1, 3 : k1 1 10
0.5 1 : k1, 2 : k1, 3 : k2 1 10
0.6 1 : k1, 2 : k2, 3 : k2 0.2 1 : k1, 3 : k2, 2 : k1 0.8 16
0.7 1 : k1, 2 : k2, 3 : k2 0.5 1 : k1, 3 : k2, 2 : k1 0.5 22
0.8 1 : k2, 2 : k1, 3 : k2 0.4 1 : k1, 2 : k2, 3 : k2 0.6 28
0.9 1 : k1, 3 : k2, 2 : k2 0.1 1 : k2, 3 : k2, 2 : k1 0.1 34
Table 4. The expected defender reward for the targets attacked
k1 = 0.5, k2 = 0.5 Tgt 1 Tgt 2 Tgt 3 Tgt 4
Expected Defender Reward 50 30 15 10
The plot (When k2 increases from 0 to 1 and k1 ﬁxed at 0.5) has two parts: the constant expected defender’s reward
part and the linearly increasing expected defender’s reward part. The reward and penalty vectors were instantiated
as Rdj = [150 90 50 40] and P
d
j = [-50 -30 -20 -20] respectively. When k1 = 0.5 and k2 = 0.5, because of the fact
that target 4 gives the lowest reward of 40 to the defender, the lowest expected defender reward turns out to be 10
for target 4 and is attacked by the attacker. As given in the table above all other targets give the defender a greater
expected reward than 10. Note the diﬀerence when we say reward and the expected reward to the defender. So, as is
evident in table 5, from k2 = 0 to 0.5, target 4 gives the lowest expected reward of 10 to the defender. From k2 = 0
to 0.4, the patrol area 3 (target 4) with defensive activity k1 i.e (3 : k1) gives the lowest expected defender reward of
10, and hence is attacked by the attacker. When mixed strategy is selected, then there may be targets other than target
4 which give the same lowest defender reward of 10. At k2 = 0.5, though the defensive activity changes to (3 : k2),
due to the pure strategy selected the lowest expected defender reward stays at 10. This explains the constant expected
defender’s reward part. After k2 crosses 0.5, in the selected mixed strategies, the lowest expected defender reward
increases linearly with increase in value of k2, which is due to the presence of k2 in (3 : k2). Again, there may be
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targets other than target 4, which give the same lowest defender reward as what is given by (3 : k2). This explains the
linearly increasing expected defender’s reward part.
Table 5. The selected mixed strategy when k1 increases from 0 to 1 and k2 ﬁxed at 0.75
Strategy Pb Strategy Pb Strategy PbRwd
k1
0.1 1:k2,2:k2,3:k10.21:k1,3:k2,2:k20.51:k2,3:k2,2:k10.3 18
0.2 1:k2,2:k2,3:k10.11:k1,3:k2,2:k20.61:k2,3:k2,2:k10.3 21
0.3 1:k2,2:k1,3:k20.31:k2,2:k2,3:k10.11:k1,3:k2,2:k20.6 23
0.5 1:k1,3:k2,2:k10.41:k1,3:k2,2:k20.6 25
0.6 1:k1,2:k2,3:k20.31:k1,3:k2,2:k10.7 25
0.8 1:k1,2:k1,3:k1 1 28
0.9 1:k1,2:k1,3:k1 1 34
The plot (when k1 increases from 0 to 1 and k2 ﬁxed at 0.75) has three parts: the linearly increasing expected
defender’s reward part, the constant expected defender’s reward part and again the linearly increasing expected de-
fender’s reward part. From k1 = 0 to 0.35, we get a mixed strategy of patrol schedules having both (3 : k2) and (3 : k1),
hence with increasing k1 we get the increase in defender’s reward. From k1 = 0.36 to 0.75, we get patrol schedule
conatining only (3 : k2), hence a constant reward of 25. From k1 = 0.75 to 1, we get schedules containing only k1,
hence with increasing k1, the increase in defender’s reward. Analysing defenders strategy with respect to defensive
activities gives insights for tactical planning.
Table 6. The selected mixed strategy of schedules
Payoﬀ: Expected Defender Reward Tgt 1 Tgt 2 Tgt 3 Tgt 4 Prob
Expected Defender Reward
1 : k1, 2 : k2, 1 : k1 207.6 124.6 12.3 12.3 0.46
1 : k2, 3 : k2, 1 : k1 207.6 124.6 12.3 12.3 0.54
targetAttacked = Target 3
reward = 12.3
3.5. Resource Allocation
The DOBSS algorithm gives the SSE mixed strategy to be played by the defender. Suppose in the game the mixed
strategy comes out to be as given below.
Table 7. The selected mixed strategy of schedules
Payoﬀs T1 T2 T3 T4 Pb
Schedules
1. (1:k1),(2:k2),(3:k1),(1:k2) 150,-15090,-90-20,2040,-400.30
2. (1:k1),(2:k2),(3:k2),(1:k1) -50,50 -30,3050,-5040,-400.51
3. (1:k2),(3:k1),(2:k2),(1:k1) 150,-15090,-9050,-50-20,200.19
Assuming number of resources (security personnel) available is 10, then the number of resources allocated to each
of the three schedules of the mixed strategy is as follows: Schedule 1 : 10 * 0.30 = 3, Schedule 2 : 10 * 0.51 = 5 and
Schedule 3 : 10 * 0.18 = 2.
214   Gaurav Chaudhary and Yadati Narahari /  Procedia Computer Science  24 ( 2013 )  205 – 216 
4. Multiple Defenders/Multiple Attackers Model
4.1. Homogenous Resources
Till now we have considered only single defender and single attacker case. A game scenario may capture the
dynamics fully if multiple defenders and multiple attackers are considered. We will show that how the utilities can be
computed in single defender/2-attacker case. Consider the following example of a nonzero-sum game.
Table 8. Single Defender/Single Attacker PayoﬀMatrix
Payoﬀ:(Defender,Attacker)Tgt 1Tgt 2 Tgt 3 Tgt 4
Schedules
1. (1:k1),(2:k1),(1:k1) 6,-4 4,-2 12,-10-20,10
2. (1:k1),(3:k1),(1:k2) 10,-8 6,-4 -20,1010,-10
3. (1:k1),(2:k1),(3:k1),(1:k1) 6,-4 4,-2 12,-1010,-10
The main issue here is how to decide the utility as it is mostly dependent on the problem domain. The game with
multiple attacker resources can be considered as a general Stackelberg game with the attacker action space being the
combination of targets to be attacked. DOBSS is the solver for general Bayesian Stackelberg games which returns
one SSE. So, it is applicable here also. Before we ﬁnd the attacker’s utilities, the action space for the attacker has to
be generated. We give a concrete example. Let’s say we have target 1, 2, 3, 4 and the attacker has 2 resources. The
attacker’s action space is then [1,2], [1,3], [1,4], [2,3], [2,4], [3,4] (and also [1], [2], [3] and [ ], if “stay home” is
allowed). In the table given below patrol area 1 covers both the targets 1 and 2.
Payoﬀ Calculation (assuming no “stay home” option):
• For the Attacker: Since defender conducts patrols, the utilities for diﬀerent attacker actions are somewhat
estimated and they may or may not be additive when there are multiple simultaneous attacks. The payoﬀs for
the pair of targets in the action space are the sum of the payoﬀs from individual targets attacked, as we have two
attacker resources, and the pair of targets get attacked by the attacker.
• For the Defender: In a pair of targets with both the targets appearing in the schedule, then the defender can
circumvent the attack at only one target at a time, the payoﬀ is sum of half the payoﬀ each individual target in
the target pair, as with probability half the defender circumvents the attack at each target of the target pair. In
a pair of targets with only one of the targets appearing in the schedule, then the defender can circumvent the
attack at only one target at a time, the payoﬀ is sum of the payoﬀ each individual target in the target pair (as one
of the individual target has a negative payoﬀ), as the defender loses out on not covering the other target of the
target pair in the schedule. But, if a patrol area covers say two targets, and both these targets appear as a target
pair in the action space, then the payoﬀs for the pair of targets in the action space are the sum of the payoﬀs
from individual targets attacked.
Table 9. Single Defender/2-Attacker PayoﬀMatrix
T1 T2 T3 T4 T1,T2T1,T3T1,T4T2,T3T2,T4T3,T4
1. 6,-4 4,-212,-10-20,10 10,-6 9,-14 -17,6 8,-12 -18,8 -14,0
2. 10,-86,-4-20,1010,-1016,-12 -15,2 10,-18 -17,6 8,-14 -15,0
3. 6,-4 4,-212,-1010,-10 10,-6 9,-7 8,-7 8,-6 7,-6 11,-10
• In Schedule 1 in the table: For (T1,T2) we have (10,-6): 10 comes by adding individual target payoﬀ i.e 6 +
4, though only one defender is there, but because the patrol area 1 covers both T1 and T2 , it is like having
2 defenders, so we add the payoﬀs, and for attacker it is just again the sum of the individual targets which is
-4 + -2 = -6 as we have 2 attacker resources, and both get circumvented at the same time. For (T1,T3), both
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covered, we have (9,-14): 9 comes from the fact that the defender circumvents only one of the target at a time,
by probability half at T1 or T3: 9 = 6*0.5 + 12*0.5 (as only 1 defender) -14 = sum of individual targets for the
attacker. Similarly, for (T2,T3). For (T1,T4), T4 not covered, we have (-17,6): -17 comes by adding half the
payoﬀ of target 1 to the payoﬀ of target 4, as in the schedule only target 1 is covered by probability half, and
target 4 is not covered by the defender. 6 is sum of individual targets for the attacker. Similarly, for (T2,T4) and
(T3,T4).
• Similarly, for Schedule 2 and Schedule 3.
4.1.1. Multiple Defender/Multiple Attacker (both not Independent)
Payoﬀ Calculation (assuming no “stay home” option): We give a concrete example for 2 defenders/2 attackers
case. The action space for both the defender and the attacker has to be generated ﬁrst. Here the payoﬀs are simply
additive. In the table given below patrol area 1 covers both the targets 1 and 2.
• For the Attacker: The payoﬀs for the pair of targets in the action space are the sum of the payoﬀs from individual
targets attacked, as we have two attacker resources, and both the targets get aatacked by the attacker.
• For the Defender: The payoﬀs for the pair of targets in the action space are the sum of the payoﬀs from
individual targets attacked, as we have two defender resources, and both the attacks get circumvented by the
defender.
4.2. Heterogeneous Resources
For heterogeneous resources, on should consider the cartesian product of all resources’s action spaces. For a pair
of “joint” actions, how to decide the utility is mostly dependent on the domain and may often require some careful
thoughts.
5. Surveillance with Targets having Threshold
We further investigate how to ﬁnd the defenders optimal strategy, if all the targets have some minimum probability
requirement, i.e by what probability each of the target must be atleast protected. For this we need to modify the
solution technique which we used earlier. The solver should be able to take the mixed strategy as the input, apply the
constraint of each target to be protected atleast by some predetermined probability, and then return a mixed strategy.
assurance level : All the targets have some minimum probability with which they should be atleast protected.
x : The leader’s policy (mixed strategy) which consists of a vector of probability distributions over the leader’s pure
strategies. Hence, xi is the proportion of times in which the pure strategy i is used in the policy.
T : The Intermediate PayoﬀMatrix.
h: The Threshold vector which gives the assurance level with which each of the target is atleast protected.
The constraint which is included into DOBSS MIQP is as follows:
∑
i∈X
xi.Ti,k ≥ hk
5.1. Experiments and Results
We analyse the mixed strategy selected when the targets to be protected have an assurance level requirement
considering the schedules having repetition/no-repetition of patrol areas.
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Table 10. The selected mixed strategy of schedules with no assurance level requirement
Payoﬀ:(Defender Rwd)Tgt 1Tgt 2Tgt 3Tgt 4 Pb
Schedules
(1:k1),(3:k2),(2: k1) 50.0 30.0 24.9 25.1 0.43
(1:k1),(3:k2),(2:k2) 50.0 30.0 24.9 25.1 0.43
Table 11. The selected mixed strategy of schedules with an assurance level of 0.65 across all targets
Payoﬀ:(Defender Rwd)Tgt 1Tgt 2Tgt 3Tgt 4 Pb
Schedules
(1:k1),(2:k2),(3:k2) 80.6 48.0 25.5 22.0 0.40
(1:k2),(2:k1),(3:k2) 80.6 48.0 25.5 22.0 0.40
Without assurance level Input:
Probability with which targets protected = [0.5 0.50 0.64 0.75] and Reward= 24.9
With assurance level Input: 0.65
Probability with which targets protected = [0.65 0.65 0.65 0.7] and Reward= 22.0
• Trade-oﬀ between enforcing a ﬁxed assurance level requirement and the defenders reward (which decreases).
6. Conclusions and Future Work
We analysed the defender’s strategies with respect to criticality of the targets. The critical targets are repeated
in the schedule and the defenders’s strategies are analysed. We were able to deduce that having a mix of repeated
and non-repeated patrol schedules covering all the targets, increased the defender’s reward, rather than having only
repeated schedules. We analysed the defender’s reward with respect to the patrolling eﬃciency probabilities of the
defensive activities conducted at the patrol areas. We deduced that the defender’s reward usually increases with the
increase in patrolling eﬃciency probability of the defensive activities. We showed by giving concrete examples, that
by generating a larger action space it is possible to model multiple defender and attacker case, for a nonzero-sum
game. Using the intermediate payoﬀmatrix, we gave a model for the problem of ﬁnding the optimal defender’s mixed
strategy where the targets have some assurance level requirement with which they should be atleast protected. We
were able to ﬁnd how the defender’s optimal strategy changes in face of targets with threshold requirements. Several
other problems can be investigated being immediate extensions of our research work. The extensions can be to model
the game with coordinated action by multiple defenders with heterogeneous security resources. Also, it will be more
interesting to model the coordinated attack by the attackers with heterogeneous resources.
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